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This paper describes a research effort to develop
models of terrorist organizations that will permit us to
simulate and predict what types of decisions these
organizations and their agents might be likely to make.
We consider a terrorist organization to be a group
whose aim in using violence is primarily to achieve a
psychological effect, whether on its adversary or its
supporters. We assume a “rational actor” model of
decision making as a point of departure and attempt to
establish the utility-theoretic decision models terrorists
might adopt in forming their organizations, in carrying
out campaigns and operations, and in maximizing their
strategic and tactical goals. The reader will recall that
the rational actor model assumes only that the
decisionmaker (and organization) seeks to take actions
that maximize its expected utility structure – the model
places no value judgment on whether the organization’s
or individual’s utility structure is warranted [1].

portions of the populations of the nations or regions
they are trying to influence, causing them to iterate
(dynamically) through several states ranging from
animosity to sympathy and membership in their
movements [2]. Campaigns and missions of a given
organization, also, appear to exhibit Markovian
cyclicalities and draw from a reasonably finite pool of
possible states and transitions.
By enumerating
possible states, transition probabilities, and utility
levels for diverse outcomes at each new state, we are
currently able to instantiate a game theoretic
representation of the organizations and actors involved,
as will be described. At present we have pursued the
repeated games model for representing terrorist
behavior in a sample scenario (Section 2), and believe
this can be extended for further simulation and
prediction effort. However, we are open as to which
approach to pursue (e.g., Bayesian networks might
prove more suited as we try to scale up) and will revisit
that as the research proceeds.

One task of our research is to determine how best to
construct decision-theoretic models of terrorist
organizations and individuals. As a working hypothesis,
we believe these organization and individual decisionmakers can be described via Markov Decision Processes
and as repeated Bayesian games. For example, in the
Maoist theory of armed struggle, the preparatory stage
is characterized by actions that seek to affect separate

Another task of this research is to cull through
literature sources (news articles, web material,
technical analyses, etc.) and to assemble a database
that contains profiles of a reasonable sample of
terrorist organizations (paramilitaries, militias, etc).
This effort has already begun, and as we begin to
assemble the material into a database, we hope to mine
it via a variety of techniques to discover the important

1. Introduction and Overview

organizational and decision-maker profile parameters
(utility structure and values), and to instantiate
Bayesian prior probability estimates useful for
bounding and predicting future types of decisions
emanating from those organizations. Some of our initial
work for assembling this database and mining it is
described in Section 3, including current utility
structure illustrations (what we refer to as utility
scorecards).
Lastly, we are interested in the computer generation of
terrorist actors within a virtual reality world, and of the
computer attempting to simulate campaigns and
mission operations. So Section 4 of this paper briefly
describes some of that effort as well.

very easily via a set of likely states of the world as
shown in Figure 2 – succeeding and escaping to return
home, or getting caught at the checkpoint or bank,
leading to being placed in custody or getting killed in a
shootout.
Figure 2 – A Markov Chain Depicting Discrete
States of the World for a Specific Terrorist Course
of Action (COA)
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2. Rational Actors and Decision Theoretic Modeling
Car-bomb

The following diagram overviews the hierarchical
nature of terrorist organization decision-making. We do
not propose to describe this in any detail here, although
Section 4 gives a preliminary such description. Indeed
there are entire books just on a single box of this
diagram (e.g., see Drake (1999) on Terrorist Target
Selection) [3]. Instead we will just provide a brief
discussion about how decision theoretic approaches can
help us to be more precise in discussing and building
models of such a process. For this discussion we shall
focus on the lower three boxes primarily.
Figure 1 – Overview of the Terrorist Organization
Decision Cycle
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Specifically, Table 1 shows that at the checkpoint, the
terrorist could find the guard well-trained and in ready
mode or in an untrained, easily surprised mode. In the
latter case, the terrorist might feel there is some degree
of positive utility in driving through unnoticed,
shooting the guard and continuing (or dying). The only
embarrassing outcome would be to get caught by an
unready guard. In the second row, the terrorist has less
utility for engaging in a shootout with a trained guard,
as getting caught can lead to eventual release. The
lower utilities in each row are for the guard and they
may be similarly interpreted.
Table 1 – Game Theory Matrix of Utilities
to Each Side For Various Scenarios and Outcome
Possibilities at the Checkpoint

Suppose a terrorist organization exists in a world that
consists of a home base and three potential targets on
the other side of a military checkpoint (city hall, a bank,
and a sports arena). Suppose further that its decision
processes have lead the organization to decide to target
the bank via a car bomb. It further knows it must get
through the checkpoint to carry out the bombing
operation. We can model the course of action (COA)
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Let us examine only the checkpoint more closely,
though we could look at each node in the same way.
Further, keep in mind that this example is illustrative,
and no real utility values have been specified. It will be
a step of the research to conduct the datamining (see
next section) and to interact with experts to elicit the
proper structure of the graphs such as Figure 2, and the
table elements and utilities such as in Table 1.
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Let us restate this more generically as a decision
analysis of the course of action (COA) options
(columns of the decision table). At each state, Si, the
decision analysis would enumerate the columns, COAj,
available to the decision maker (agent) in that situation.
They would be things like, "drive through unnoticed",
"attack", etc. These are not intended as general options.
Each situation (node) is different and would have its
own COA options, although presumably these would be
fairly common and would be found from datamining as
described in the next section.
The agent would next assign an expected utility, uj, to
each COA. This would be based on a listing of
possibility consequences, which would again be
specific to the current state or situation, although
ideally also tied to overall mission achievement, and
generated from the datamining for Bayesian prior
probabilities (and expert interviewing). In addition to a
utility, each possibility outcome would also be assigned
a probability, Pj, based on the agents’ beliefs about
achieving that possibility if the option is selected.
Expected utility, Ej, is calculated in the usual way (sum
across outcomes of utility times probability). This gives
the agent an ability to examine strength of belief that a
given COA increases mission achievement and a basis
to make a decision. For example, if expected utility of
the jth COA is E_j, then the rational agent attempts to
maximize E as follows:
Max z = COAScore(i )
S .t.
COAScore j = E j
J

= ∑ Pij u j
j =1

E j : the expected utility of COA j
Pjk : the probability of next State k under COA j
u jk : the utility of next State k under COA j

Of course, in a game theoretic model, the rational
choice is not always the strict maximum for a single
agent, but rather the maximum that can be obtained
based on the opponent’s actions as well. This leads to
the notion of equilibrium points in the game matrix and
to the idea that the agents might attempt other decision
criteria other than strict maximizing [4,5]. Some
alternative criteria might be:
• Minimax or even Maximin
• Decisions Under Risk
• Decisions Under Uncertainty
While this remains to be proven, we do, however,
currently believe that many terrorists will tend to follow
basic tenets of statistical reasoning, since they believe

they are part of a campaign and that their particular
COAs will be followed up by other members [6].
Furthering their cause can be achieved even if they get
caught or killed, and so they might not be inclined to
adopt the Westerner’s tendency to become risk averse
and dominated by a non-probabilistic reasoning, such
as the criterion of least regret (as applied to a soldier’s
life)[7].
This is not to say that terrorist reasoning is error-free,
and it is likely that behavioral decision theory and other
judgment biases do exist for terrorist groups. For
example, group think and mob rule will often occur in
crowd scenes, while terrorist organizations are known
to use anchoring and adjusting from news reports about
other terrorist group’s actions. Similarly, the need to
appease the political spectrum of a terrorist
organization’s supporters can also sway decisionmaking toward one extreme or another. And,
continuing the life of the organization often becomes
paramount, introducing more conservative thinking in
certain respects [3]. In general we believe we can
introduce such behavioral biases into our expected
utility model by adjusting the utilities of a given utility
structure or scorecard. Thus we can add a weighted
multiplier for aggressiveness or riskiness, etc. to model
such biases.
3. Database Construction and Datamining for
Utility Scorecards
The information held in the database of terrorist
operations is to be a compendium of attributes that can
be sorted relationally for the purpose of determining
what cases most closely resemble a given situation
within the game environment. Each operation is a
node within the database, and is composed of
“scorecards” which are categories of attributes, and
exist as sub-nodes.
An example of an operation entry would be:
PIRA 10/2/72 West Belfast.
Attack on
undercover army recon unit “MRF” killing driver of
van conducting surveillance [8].
One example of many scorecards that would exist
under this entry would be:
Operation environment: Urban
Where the available values in the scorecard would be:
Urban
Settled
Rural
Forest
Desert
Alpine/Arctic

The scorecard attributes are to characterize the terrorist
organization, its ideology, political goals, campaign
characteristics, operational environment, capabilities,
tactics, and many other attributes. By means of these
characterizations we hope to be able to know, when
presented with a particular situation in a simulation,
what a terrorist would really do. If we can know this,
we can realistically bound the utility structure (COAs
for a given state) and assign utilities to the actions of
the terrorist agent within the simulation.
Figure 3 – Illustrative Scorecards for the Car
Bomber-Checkpoint Scenario

100% -

Terrain
Bank

l
t
p
le
t
ban ettledRura eser Jung wam fores
Ur
D
S
S

City Hall

User specifies scorecard settings for simulation environment below:
WA- Operational environment:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Urban %
Settled % Rural %
Forest %Desert %
Alpine/Arctic % Littoral %-

Sporting
Event

Pop. Ratios

•
•
•
•
•

Own Group % Allied group % Adversary 1 % Adversary 2 % Neutral % -

WC- External sanctuary level:

100% -

Checkpoint

•
•
•

None
Low
Medium
High

WD- Level of external support:

Political
situation
hy ation cracy ation arian
ict
nfl
t
p o
arc
n
An occu Dem domi otali an co
i
T
n
r
c
g
ta
ni
rei
Sec
Eth
Fo
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WE- Political situation:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stable democracy
Democracy in turmoil
Civil war
Sectarian conflict
Anarchy
Totalitarian regime
Ethically dominated regime
Foreign Military occupation

WB- Population Ratios:

The user must create some scorecards which
define the situation in which the terrorist SAF
will operate:
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Table 2 – Some of the Scorecards that have been
Mined from the Database About The World In
Which a Guerilla Organization Exists

Etc….

For instance, for the terrorist car bombing operation
referred to in earlier Figure 2, Figure 3 shows the
terrain, with some of the attributes thereof represented
as scorecards. It also shows the ideology and population
support. Note that the operation takes place in an urban
setting. This has a correlation with the above example
of the terrorist operation in West Belfast. By assigning
high probability to agent’s actions that are similar to the
actions recorded in the scorecards for the above PIRA
operation and others that correlate highly, we can
attempt to automate the generation of the game matrix
(COAs, utilities) for a new state of the world.
To summarize, within the database of terrorist
operations there is to be a dataset for each operation,
type of organization, etc. Each datum within the
dataset is a “scorecard” that records an attribute of the
operation, such as the terrain, the ideology of the
organization, the type of weapons used, the type of
security encountered by the agent or agents, the
objective of the operation, and so on. These scorecards
are used to filter information into and out of the
database, plus they can serve as a usage device.

•
•
•
•

WF- Security environment rating:
•
•
•

Little security against agent
Moderate security
High security

WG- Security environment attributes:
•
•
•
•
•
•

ID/travel documents required
Checkpoints/ID checks common
Opponent has informant network
Poor intel gathering by opponent
Good intel gathering by opponent
Excellent intel gathering by opponent

None
Low
Medium
High

Consider an example of how the database structures
(scorecards) can be used as a user interface. Table 2
shows one such worksheet, which would become a
program interface, by which the user enters a profile of
the simulated “world” in which the terrorist
organization and agents are to operate. The scorecards
in Table 2 correspond to scorecards within the database
of terrorist operations, and in this way the scorecards
are used to screen the database for corollaries of the
current situation within the simulation. We explain the
screening process in the next section.
To carry this process one step further, the reader should
realize there is a set of scorecards like Table 2 for each
of the layers of the hierarchical decision model that
was introduced as earlier Figure 1. Thus there is a set
of scorecards for organization design, campaign
planning, mission selection and planning, and
operations (COA execution). As but one more
example, Table 3 shows an illustration of the
organization worksheet and some of the scorecards
associated with it.

Table 3 – Some of the Scorecards that have been
Mined from the Database About The Attributes of
a Terrorist Organization
Organization Initialization Worksheet
OA- Ideology:
• Separatism
• Religion
• Liberalism
• Anarchism
• Communism
• Conservatism
• Fascism
• Single-issue
• Organized Crime

OD - Membership type:
• Intellectual/ideological
• Ethic affiliation
• Religious affiliation
• Mercenary
OE- Membership number:
Enter number of active members
Enter % of total population:

OB - Aims:
• Marxist revolution
• Attain autonomy for ethic group
• Expel occupying military force
• Enrich self/group
• Agitate public to support authoritarian rule
• Establish unity of religious community
• Cast off rule of other religious group
• Undermine authoritarian rule
• Defend existing order
OC - Constituency:
• Ethnic minority
• Ethnic majority
• Religious minority
• Religious majority
• Economic underclass
• Economic middle
• Economic upper class

Supporters %-

Uncommitted %Unsympathetic %Opponents %Enemies %-

Figure 4Model of Population Opinion (Regarding an Organization)
Finite States in a Markov Chain
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Etc.

4. Putting it All Together: Virtual World
Construction & Simulation Procedures
Figure 5 illustrates a decision theoretical, game theorybased approach for the modeling of a terrorist agent
and organization within a computer generated
simulation environment. The flowchart uses a casebased approach to establishing utility structures and
weights for the agent’s actions. The flowchart currently
is initiated by a human filling in the preliminary
scorecards, or “worksheets,” that describe the situation
to be modeled.

Potential Sympathizers %-

Since we have defined terrorism as violence for
psychological effect, it would be useful to model the
opinion of the population regarding the group. To that
end we have devised a model of population opinion as a
series of finite states in a Markov chain, with the
terrorists’ course of action affecting the probability of
shift from one state to another [3].

Members

of the cased-based, offline agent generator described in
the next section.

Terrorist Operational
Choices (xi )

This model is not one that need be developed on the
virtual battlefield; rather it conceived of as component

1)
In The topmost box, the user characterizes the
simulated “world” in which the terrorist organization
and its agents are to operate. This involves filling in the
weights for earlier Table 2.
2)
In the next box, the user makes some initial
characterizations
of
the
simulated
terrorist
organization, and this is used to create a baseline
generic terrorist organization, which is really a small
set of scorecards describing the organization (as shown
in earlier Table 3).
3)
Automated Campaign Planning: The program
uses these characterizations to filter the database of real
terrorist operations, in order to create a terrorist
campaign applicable to the present situation.
4)
Automated Mission Selection: Selection of a
target within the simulation based on the present
situation, the campaign and analysis of the database for
antecedents to the present conditions.
5)
Automated mission planning: Planning the
operational details of the mission based on the present
situation, the target selected, and analysis of the
database for antecedents to the present conditions.
6)
Conduct Operation: Implementation of the
agent, tasked to the specified mission, on the virtual
battlefield and simulation to execute the COA.
In this way the program would refine the initial
requirements of the user to produce a terrorist
organization and agent that would behave in a realistic
way within the confines of the simulation [9].
While we have emphasized machine intelligence in
much of this discussion, each element in this process
should have the capacity to be manually altered by the
user, allowing for the steering of the semi-automated
process as it accesses the case database and the various
models that have been built during the run of the
program. To that end we are designing a user interface
that can interview the user and elicit suggested
refinements

Figure 5-

Flowchart for Terrorist Decision Simulation

User initializes terrorist organization:
Configuring scorecards identifying group ideology, political objectives,
and constituency.
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+ organizational standards
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personnel, C2, POW’s

Scorecard DB, Case Base, and Knowledge Bases

User initializes SimEnvironment:
Configuring scorecards identifying various aspects of the
situation such as terrain, population ratios, security, and political situation

Terrorist agent on virtual battlefield

Simulation Environment
4) Looking forward: Present capability, JSAF
Integration, and Threat Prediction
Presently we are pursuing the development of the
PMF/scorecard database and its user interfaces, and we
feel that this approach will be able, as output, to provide
a detailed profile of a terrorist operation that is realistic
for a given situation. This model terrorist will be
generated offline as part of the process of implementing
a terrorist agent within a simulation environment such
as the military’s Joint Semi-Automated Forces or
(JSAF) software environment. [10] This model
generation is independent of any implementation within
a simulation such as JSAF, but one that we feel could
be used to provide a detailed behavioral model for a
terrorist semi-automated force.
A further consideration is whether this system holds the
potential for actually predicting what a particular
terrorist is likely to do. It would seem that there is
some scope for prediction, but that the main thrust
would be simulating the operational environment. If
one is attempting to simulate just a small town or
region, some good predictions may be arrived at.
However, if the operational scope of the terrorist is
large, even international, the prospects for accurately
predicting an actual act of terrorism seem small, given
the vastness of potential targets in this environment.
Some other subtle aspects of modeling terrorist
behavior are also problematic. The knowledge base
may provide an accurate model for a military campaign

for the terrorist in a given situation, but how does the
campaign evolve in reaction to countermeasures or a
changing situation? Also, clandestinity is itself known
to cause behavior changes such as escalating violence
in the absence of central control of the operators. Also
“risky shift” may occur where increasingly risky
activities are undertaken in reaction to ideological and
peer pressures.
“Group think” may occur that
suppresses rational planning and objection by minority
opinions within the organization [3]. These and other
factors are research dimensions we have only just
begun to model. Presently our case-based model
generator does not provide for such evolving aspects
of terrorist behavior. Predictive modeling of terrorist
behavior would seem to require their inclusion in the
equation, and we hope to investigate this further.
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